## Chapter 3

## Go Seigen-Fujisawa

Fujisawa Kuranosuke was a long-time rivial of Go Seigen. If we talk about the games between the two, none was more famous than their 2nd 10-game series, played in 1952. At the time, they were the only 9-dans in Japan (thus in the entire world) - Fujisawa was the first player to be promoted to 9 dan under the Oteai system, in 1949, and Go Seigen was awarded the rank of 9-dan in 1950 (he was not belong to Nihon Kiin, thus he couldn't get promoted under Oteai, the Nihon Kiin rating tournament).

Today, the number of 9 -dans in the world is approaching 100 , if not yet reached. But before World War II, the only 9-dan in the world would be the Meijin. So after the death of the last Meijin, Shusai, there was no 9-dan for a long time (about 10 years), until Nihon Kiin decided to promote her own 9-dans.

Anyway, by 1950, there were suddenly two 9-dans. (Incidentially, the 2nd 9-dan promoted under the Oteai system was Sakata Eio in 1955.) Naturally, everyone wanted to know who was better, and the two players were not shy to set up such a battle either. Finally in the end of 1951, the 2nd Go-Fujisawa 10-game series were under way, sponsored by Yomiuri Shimbon (a major Japanese newspaper). Recall that in their 1st 10-game series in 1944, Fujisawa beat Go Seigen 6-4 (Fujisawa held black throughout the series, since at the time, Go Seigen, still in Nihon Kiin, was an 8-dan, while Fujisawa a 6-dan).

Each player was given 13 hours in every game. The very first game probably earned a seat in Go history. What happened was that both players misread at a corner fight! At the end, when Go Seigen played one more move at that corner, Fujisawa resigned. How could they *both* misread? Probably both knew how important the game was, and after three days of tense fight, their feelings were not so sharp. But the 4-dan who was recording the game did not miss it! After the game, he pointed it out to the two 9-dan's that Black (Fujisawa) could have won the fight at that corner, and maybe the game too. I think it would be interesting to see a 4-dan teaching two 9 -dans, or rather, a relaxed player teaching two nervous players. :-) Unfortunately I don't remember that 4 dan's name; believe me, he would be an excellent kibitzer on IGS. :-)

Despite such an unlucky loss, Fujisawa was unbeaten the next three games, with 2 wins and 1 tie, thus leading the series 2-1-1. People started to think, Hmmm, after all, Fujisawa was stronger! Then it came the turning point of the series, the fifth game. In
this game, Fujisawa had a good lead but he couldn't hold it. When Go Seigen finally turned this game around, he turned the whole series around. He did not just win this fifth game; he won all the remaining 5 games as well.

After the 10th game, both players were interviewed by NHK (Japanese Boradcasting Association). I think the conversations were interesting:

Go Seigen said, "Since the beginning I've thought that luck decides to win or to lose; if one is lucky, then he wins; if he's unlucky, then he may lose."

Many years later, when he recalled this game, he said, "One cannot win a game just because he wants to. The outside world is always disturbing. If my mind is shaken by this disturbance, I would lose. Luckily at that time, eitehr before the series or during the series, I had a peaceful mind."

Then NHK's microphone turned to Fujisawa. "Miserable loss!" He said with a bitter smile. However, immediately, Fujisawa challenged Go Seigen again for yet another 10 -game series. In fact, before their 2nd series (the one just finished), they had agreed that no matter what the outcome of the series would be, the loser could challenge again, and the winner must accept.

A year later, Fujisawa lost again in their third 10-game series. This time by a score of 5-1 and the series did not continue. This was a significant loss by Fujisawa. To prepare the series, he neglected his Nihon Kiin obligations, such as Honinbo tournament. As a result, he was heavily criticized. If he was to go on to lose to Go Seigen, one can imagaine, the responsibility Fujisawa would have to bear might be too heavy. And he realized so; right after the loss of the six game (the final game) of the series, he resigned from Nihon Kiin. I would like to quote a piece from the newly published "The Go Player's Almanac" by Ishi Press, 1992. On page 64, John Power writes:

Fujisawa resigned from the Nihon Ki-in and changed his given name to Hosai, a name with Buddhist overtones more fitting for a retiree than an active player. His humiliation in the jubango [10-game series] made him a tragic figure and obscured the fact that he was a great player. In match play, one misstep, one wrong turn can adversely affect the whole series, and, as we have seen, Fujisawa had his share of bad luck. Nontheless, the two postwar matches with him are remembered as one of the highlights of Go [Seigen's] career.

Suddenly I realized, Go Seigen's comments that "luck decides outcome" were not merely some modest words after his victory.

Finally, an interesting fact about Fujisawa. We know there are two famous Fujisawa's, Kuranosuke (Hosai) and Shuko. I heard that they were uncle and nephew, and when I was younger, I had always thought that Hosai was the uncle. After all, he's older. Not until recently that I found, first he is not that much older, but 6 years; secondly, he is the *nephew*.

By the way, Fujisawa Hosai retired this very year, 1992, while his younger uncle, Shuko, set the new record of being the oldest player to win a major tournament (Shuko already set the record last year).

The 1st Japan's Strongest Deciding Matches
Go Seigen vs Fujisawa
White: Go Seigen 9 dan
Black: Fujisawa Hosai 9 dan
January 9-10, 1957
Atami, Japan
Komi: 0
Result: B+Resign
Time: 10 hours each.


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Diagram 1: 1-12
(10) at $\otimes$

Go Seigen (Wu) vs.
Fujisawa
(The 1st Japan's Strongest Deciding Matches) Black:
Fujisawa Hosai, 9d
White: Go Seigen (Wu), 9d
Date: January 9-10, 1957
Place: Atami
1: This is my first encounter with Fujisawa 9 dan after the 10 -game series 4
years ago [1953; the 3rd Wu-Fujisawa 10-game series].
Fujisawa 9-dan deliberates on every move; never hasty. His steady and thick style has well settled in the Go world.
B \#1 takamoku [(4,5) point at the corner] is rarely seen in Fujisawa 9-dan's game. It's probably a personal interest intriguered by a recent game of mine. This will be explained a little bit later.
2: Fujisawa 9-dan's original given name was Kuranosuke, later changed to Hosai. In his early years, as one of the strongest young players, he was regarded as unbeatable playing Black. He was also the first player promoted to 9-dan after Honinbo Shusai [the last Meijin]. In 1943, as a 6-dan, he played Go Seigen (then 8-dan) a 10-game series in which he played all games with Black. Fujisawa won the series 6-4. Then in 1951, a 4-game series with Wu (Wu won all four). In 1952, a 6-game series (Wu 5-1) and the second Wu-Fujisawa 10-game series (Wu 5-2-1 with 1 tie). Finally in 1953, the third Wu-Fujisawa 10-game series, which ended after Wu led 5-1. nst Sakata Eio.

Fujisawa played White and adopted a move-imitating strategy, but lost at the end to Sakata. This game here is the second by Fujisawa after his name change.
3: B \#1 and \#3 occupying takamoku points at diagonal corners is the opening Suzuki Etsuo 7-dan used in a game versus me. Fujisawa 9-dan was then the referee, and he watched the game from the beginning to the end. That game was won by Black. Perhaps Fujisawa 9-dan learned some winning strategy from the game, and here he applies the same "diagonal takamoku" opening.
4: W \#2 and \#4 play komoku $[(3,4)$ point at the corner], choosing a most common opening strategy. So far it's exactly the same as the game between Suzuki and me mentioned before. To resemble kendo [Japanese fencing], B raises his sword way above his head, ready to cut down, while W levels his sword, pointing to opponent's throat.
5: In the game mentioned before, Suzuki 7-dan suddenly played B \#5 at [a], an unexpected odd move. I guess Fujisawa 9-dan probably would not use such a novel move against me. However it was not impossible, but I was ready. In fact, even if Ba , there is nothing to be afraid of.
Indeed, B didn't play [a], but \#5, a common play, instead
6: W \#6 [D3] is the normal way against takamoku [ $(4,5)$ point]. Also, allowing B to have shimari [corner enclosure move] at both corners would be disadvantageous to W in an opening. Therefore, \#6 is also absolutely the move.
7: $\mathrm{B} \# 7$ is a basic joseki.
Fujisawa 9-dan used this move when he played 10-game series with me, and he had used it before that. Also, he chose this joseki in Mainichi Shimbon sponsored Honinbo Sen. This is a shape he likes.
If W plays here right away -
[The variations show variations for W \#8.]
8: Anyways, if W acts at lower left right away, immidate fights are almost certain to follow [as the variations show], so I adopted tenuki [ignoring lower left], and turned to upper left. W \#8 shimari [enclose corner].
9: B \#9 is a joseki move. This move -
[See the variation.]
Next, if W wants to activate one W stone [D3] -
[The variations show references.]
10: [Conclusion on variations of W \#10] When B \#9 [E2], W can live simply with [D2] block. However, if W just attempts to live here, it's definitely not the best strategy.
W \#10 [B5], a "quick shift" strategy, is also a joseki. This is a strategy I like. I have used it many times before; it's a light way to play.
11: B \#11 of course. If -
[See the variation.]
12: W \#12 [C8] and \#10 [B5] are related moves. The goal is to sacrifice [D3] stone, forming a moyo at the left side.


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Or -


Variation 1 at move 8 in Diagram 1: 116
variation 1 ( W \#8)
[After B [F4]...]
1: B [C5] is a common joseki.
2: But starting with B [D4]...
16: ... to B [E6], this joseki gives B a very thick shape.
B's next move can play kakari [corner approaching] at either upper left or lower right, and this is exactly W's opening plan.

## Variation 2.1

 at move 23 in Variation 2variation 2 (W \#8)


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Variation 2.1 (continued): 1-11
(4) at $\otimes$

## reference

[Suppose W rushes at G4...]
11: To here, it's a joseki that was use often in very early years. In this game, B is quite thick and thus better. So recently, W has chosen to play simply [H3] instead of [G4] rush.

Variation 2 at move 8 in Diagram 1: 122

## variation 2 (W \#8)

[Again, after B [F4]...]
1: [When W [C5]...]
2: B could choose to play [C4] hane from inside. This is a joseki that leads to immediate fights.
22: To W [H2], it's a local period.
If W [H2] chooses to rush at [a]...
[See the reference]
White[hr


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## Variation 3 at move 10 in Diagram 1

Variation 3 (continued): 1-3
variation
If $B$ plays [C3] instead of [E2]...
1: W [C2] hane, and...
3: ...[E2]. Next, W can take either [a] or [b]. W is good.
[The above explains why $B$ chose [E2] in the game.]


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Variation 4 at move 10 in Diagram 1: 19
reference 1 (W \#10) [After B [E2]...] 1: W [D2] blocks... 9: ... to here, W lives. This is also a joseki.
Note
in this sequence, if B [C5] played at [a] or [b], B would end up with gote. So [C5] is better. Also -

Variation 5 at move 10 in Diagram 1: 18
reference 2 (W \#10)
[After B [E2]...]
1: When W [D2]...
2: If B [C4] kosum-
i...

8: ... to here is a certainly sequence. Now, if W gives in a little bit to defend - [a] isn't a bad move.
Of course, W lives even if without [B2], but let [a] sente to gain is quite intolerable.


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Variation 6 at move 12 in Diagram 1

Variation 6 (continued): 1-6
variation
If [B4] attaches (instead of [C4])...
6: ...To here, W lives in sente.


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Diagram 2: 13

13: $B$ \#13 gets the biggest point on the board.
If this move to play at [a], it's also big, but \#13 kakari is urgent.

Diagram 3: 14

14: W \#14 could also consider to play at [a]. It's difficult to say which one is better.
If [a] for W \#14, it would become a different game.


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A B C D E F G H J K L M N O P Q R S T

Diagram 4: 15

15: B \#15 joseki.
If B[a] kosumi, it's also a joseki, and it's a solid way to play. [See the joseki.]

Variation 7 at move 16 in Diagram 4


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Variation 7 (continued): 1-6

## variation

[B [O4] is also a joseki...]
6: [...up to here. Repeat Wu's comment: it's solid.]
In
the above sequence, B [R3] could play [R2] directly; that would be a common modern joseki, but it had not appeared at this time [1957].

Diagram 5: $16-18$

16: W \#16 is joseki.
$\mathrm{W}[\mathrm{a}]$ is also a move
[See the variation.]
But as a result [of this variation], this part is almost settled, and W should not be satisfied.
17: B \#17 good point.
Since $W$ [M4] is "high" [at line 4], B \#17 also plays high to squeeze [M4] stone.

Besides \#17, there are several other big points on the board, but \#17 is the most urgetn.
Next move W \#18 is a difficult point of this opening, it's also a key to decide the outcome of the game.

Under this situation, most common plays [for W \#18] are -
[The variations show variations.]
18: This move, $\mathrm{W} \# 18$, is still better off to adopt the plays shown in variations 1 and 2. W \#18 led extremely unfavorable influence [to W] later in the game. This is the intersection point of the opening, and based on the result, this move [W \#18] is very bad.


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## Variation 8 at move

 17 in Diagram 5

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Variation 8 (continued): 1-9

## variation

[If W chooses to play [P5]...]
9:

Variation 9 at move 18 in Diagram 5: 117
(9) at 2
variation 1 (W \#18)
[After B [K4]...]
1: W [N6] keima [knight jump]...
2: If B [R3] tsuke [attach]...
17: ...To here, locally it comes to an end.
Also when W [N6] keima -


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Variation 10 at move 18 in Diagram 5: 1-3
variation 2 (W \#18)
[Again,
after B [K4]...]
1: When W [N6]...
2: B [O4] kosumi is also common...
3: If so, W [L6] jumps.
At the time, these two diagrams [varation 1\&2] jumped to my head at first, but then, as the record shows, I adopted an immediate attack.

## Diagram 6: 19

19: B \#19 certainly. This move, if [a] instead -
[See the variation.]


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A B C D E F G H J K L M N O P Q R S T

Variation 11 at move 20 in Diagram 6

Variation 11 (continued): 1-3

## variation

If B [Q4]...
3: ...To here, B [P6] stone loses its activity. B is not good.


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Diagram 7: 20-21

20: W \#20 is the only move, and it's a subsequential move following \#18 [P4].
W[a] instead would be mediocre.
Next, how should B \#21 respond? Let's take a look.
[The variations show referneces.]
21: Therefore, B \#21 [Q4] to atar$i$ from this side is a good move.

Variation 12 at move 21 in Diagram 7: 1-11
reference 1 (B \#21)
[After W [O5]...]
1: If B [P5] cuts...
11: ...To here, an exchange is a certain concequece.
Now
let's analyze the efficiency of each side -
[See the analysis.]


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A B C D E F G H J K L M N O P Q R S T

Variation 12.1 at move 12 in Variation 12
reference 1 (B \#21)

## Variation

12.1 (continued)
reference
Analysis: Each side captured two stones. Although that seems to be equal, but if we take these captured stones
out from the board, forming a picture as shown, we can see that although both side have used equal numbers of stones, W's efficiency is slightly higher.


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Variation 13 at move 21 in Diagram 7: 1-10
reference 2 ( B \#21)
[After W [O5]...]
1: [If B [P5] cut...]
2: [These first couple of moves are the same as in reference 1.]

6:
[When W [M3]...]
7: If $B$ [N6] to capture the two W stones [instead of [N2] shown in reference 1]...
10: W [O3] and
[N3] to cut down one B stone at the corner. This way, not only W gained huge on territory, W[a] hane is still remained. Clearly W good.
[Conclusion of ref 1\&2: cut at [P5] doesn't lead good result for B]


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18

A B C D E F G H J K L M N O P Q R S T

Diagram 8: 22-24
22. W of course \#22 connects.
23: B \#23 is also the only move.
24: W \#24 can only cut from here. If W cuts from [a] [See the short variation.]

Variation 14 at move 25 in Diagram 8


A B C D E F G H J K L MNOPQRST


Variation 14 (continued): 1-3

## variation

If W cuts at [O3]...
3: ...To here, W loses big on territoy. This scheme is not worth a consideration.

Diagram 9: 25-28

25: If B \#25 plays at [a], the ladder wouldn't work, and B would be in serious trouble.
27: These couple of moves are certain; no variations.


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Diagram 10: 29

29: To B \#29, it's a settled shape.
Although locally speaking,
it looks like a "fair trade." But B \#29 has a perfect distance from the shimari at upper right corner. Counting this, W is at the lower hand.
Next if W[a] jumps , $\mathrm{B}[\mathrm{b}]$ is a good point; or if $\mathrm{W}[\mathrm{b}]$, then $\mathrm{B}[\mathrm{a}]$ is a good point.
In short, this unfavorable result is caused by the "improper taste" of W \#18 and \#20 [P4-O5].


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34: W \#34 has no other choice. If this move plays a[P9] [See the variation.]


Diagram 11: 30-34

30: W \#30 is stil1 better to jump at [a] [despite the fac$t$ that, pointed out previously, B [R11] would be a good point].
Now, if B[b] cut -
[See the variation.]
33: B \#33 is stil1 an extremely good point. Next $\mathrm{B}[\mathrm{a}$ ] is severe. W is indeed difficult now.
[See the variation for the next move, W \#34]

Variation 15 at move 31 in Diagram 11: 1-10

## variation

[After W [Q8]...]
1: If $B$ cuts at [R8]... 10: To here, W gets [R13], and W becomes easier.


A B C D E F G H J K L MNOPQRST


A B C D E F G H J K L M N O P Q R S T

Variation 16 at move 34 in Diagram 11: 1-4
variation (W \#34)
[After B [R11]...]
1:
If W plays [Q11]...
4: When B [R10],
W's eyeshapes are lost. W certainly can't be satisfied.

Variation 17 at move 35 in Diagram 11


A B C D E F G H J K L MNOPQRST


A B CDEFGHJKLMNOPQRST

Variation 17 (continued): 1-7

## variation

[If W \#34 plays here...]
7: ...To here, not only B gains huge territory, W team is still "floating" despite capturing one stone [at P8].

Diagram 12: 35

35: B \#35 is thick. This move to play at [a] is a big point, but then W would get [P9], aiming next at [b] invasion.
B \#35 fully exhibit-
s Fujisawa 9-dan's thick and solid style.


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Diagram 13: 36-37

36: If W \#36 plays [a], it would be a good point too. Then $B$ would get [b] for sure. Hard to say which one is better.
37: B \#37 rush is a common method to test opponent's response.
If W \#38 blocks at [R9] -
[See the variation.]

Variation 18 at move 38 in Diagram 13: 1-4

## variation (W \#38)

[After B [R10]...]
1: If W [R9] block-
S...

4: B connects back.
W's
eye-
shapes are deprived, and W would be under attack.


A B CDEFGHJKLMNOPQRST

Diagram 14: 38-41

38: If W \#38 plays at [a], B would have [b], and when W *then* plays [S9], $\mathrm{B}[\mathrm{c}]$ would deprive the eyeshape from W; W would be under attack.
39: B \#39 turns to invade the left side. Extremely good timing. Next B aims to play [C13], at the meantime threatens to attack two W stones [C8-B5] below.

40: If W \#40 plays directly at [C12], B would certainly block at [B4]. W \#40 to extend is also a big move regarding to territory. W cannot miss it.
41: B of course plays \#41.


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Diagram 15: 42-43

42: W \#42 too is certainly the move. To let B play [a] would be unbearable.
W
\#42 forms a squeeze attack against one B stone [C10]. What should B play nex$t$ ?
[See the variation for B's next move, \#43]

Variation 19 at move 43 in Diagram 15: 1-6
variation (B \#43)
[After W [C12]...]
1: B [B7] is a tesuji.
*However*...
2: W would play [B8]...
6: To [D8], W sacrifices two stones at the corner. This way, not only W builds a solid wall at the outside, an aji of [a] hane is still remained. The corner is not clean for B .


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Diagram 16: 44

44: W \#44 is not a good-taste move, but there is no other better moves. If played at [a], B[b] and W is sealed inside.
Also, if W \#44 plays [c] jump, it would leave $B$ a move at [d] to capture two W stones. This way, W losses territory.

Diagram 17: 45-48

45: $\mathrm{B}[\mathrm{a}]$ instead of \#45 is lack of pressure on W.
46: W \#46 forms a bad shape. But again, W has no other choices.
48: If W doesn't play \#48 now, and let $B$ to play here, not only B would remove W's base, B also gains territory. Very big.


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Diagram 18: 49-55

49:
\#49 tsuke [squeeze move] to deprive the eyeshape of W, thus forcing W to escape, is indeed a severe tesuji, although B[a] can also be considered. After that [The variation shows $B[a]$ variation.]

Variation 20 at move 50 in Diagram 18


A B C D E F G H J K L MNOPQRST


19

Variation 20 (continued): 1-8

## variation

[Suppose [S11] for B...]

1: W [Q10] rush is certain...
8: To [O13], B forms moyo at middle - not a bad strategy.

Diagram 19: 56-59

56: If W[a] for \#56 -
[See the variation.]
This is the key point of the game; \#56 hane is the only move.
When \#56, what if B \#57 cuts at [b]? -
[See the variation for B \#57.]
57: B \#57 double hane. Good move. This move is indeed severe, and difficult for W to handle.


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A B C D E F G H J K L MNOPQRST

Variation 21 at move 57 in Diagram 19

Variation 21 (continued): 1-3

## variation

[Suppose [P12] for W...]

3: After B [O11] and [N13], W is in trouble.


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Variation
22 at move 57 in Diagram 19: 1-18
variation (B \#57)
[When
W \#56 (O11)...]
1: If B \#57 cut...
4: ...W would atari then cut...
11: ...Here is a certain sequence...
13:
...after W \#58 and B \#59 exchange...
14: ...W \#70 blocks...

15: ...B has no way but \#71 and...

17: ...[and] \#73. Thus a semeai [capturing race]. Although B wins this semeai, but even though W is captured, the loss is at most 20 points, but...
18: ...[but] with W \#74, not only W destories B corner, W has subsequent attacks against B . Moreover, W has $\mathrm{Wa}[\mathrm{N} 11]$ aji. Based on this result, W is not in bad shape even if giving up 10 stones.
But B didn't hastily cut at P12, instead applied a powerful counterattack.


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Diagram 20: 60-63

62: W has no other choices here.
63: If B [a] instead for \#63, some weakness would be remained underneath, hence $B[a]$ is not solid. However, if $\mathrm{B}[\mathrm{a}]$ forces $\mathrm{W}[\mathrm{b}]$, next $B[c]$ is a smooth pace. If so, $B[a]$ isn't bad either.

Diagram 21: 64-82

64: W \#64 emploies a deep scheme. \#64's intension is, if B[a] -
[See the reference.]
65: Against W \#64 [Q14], B \#65 and...
67: ...[and] \#67 are the strongest response.
Next -
[See the variation for W \#68.]
68: W \#68 is the only move.
Also, if W atari at [P15] [in the previ-
ous variation, W atari at [O14]] -
[See thenother variation for \#68.]
69: B \#69 is also the only move.

71: W's plan is to catch some chances to apply tesuji's at the corner.
75: B \#75 is absolutely the only move. This move -
[The variations show variations.]
78: When B \#77 [R18], W \#78 throws in a stone first is tesuji.
[The variations show variations.]
80: W \#80 is tesuji related to \#78 [throw-in move at R12].
82: If W[a] for \#82 -
[See the variation.]


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Variation 23 at move 65 in Diagram 21: 1-4

## reference

[W [Q14]'s intension is...] 1: If B plays [R13]... 4: W [N13] and [N14].
Had [Q14] played at [a], B would get [b] and W stones at upper side are influenced.


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10

A B C D E F G H J K L M N O P Q R S T

Variation 24 at move 68 in Diagram 21: 1-4
variation (W \#68)
[When B [R13]...]
1: If W simply [O14] atari...
4: B [L16] is a severe move. This way, W would be under a splitting attack. Difficult for W.

Variation 25 at move 69 in Diagram 21


A B C D E F G H J K L MNOPQRST


A B C D E F G H J K L MNOPQRST

Variation 25 (continued): 1-5
variation
[If W rashly cuts at [P15]...]
5: W fails.

Variation 26 at move 76 in Diagram 21


ABCDEFGHJKLMNOPQRST


A B C D E F G H J K L M N O P Q R S T

Variation 26 (continued): 1-3

## variation 1

If B reduces W's liberties from outside with [Q16] (instead of [T14])...
3: W [T14] is tesuji. Next [a] and [b] are miai. B fails.

Variation 27 at move 76 in Diagram 21


A B C D E F G H J K L MNOPQRST


A B C D E F G H J K L MNOPQRST

Variation 27 (continued): 1-3
variation 2
Or [unlike in variation 1], if B plays [R17] sagari [extending downwards]...
3: W would win this semeai.

Variation 28 at move 79 in Diagram 21


A B C DEFGHJKLMNOPQRST


ABCDEFGHJKLMNOPQRST

Variation 28 (continued): 1-3
variation 1
If W hashly hane at [T18]...
3: W is not good.

Variation 29 at move 79 in Diagram 21


A B C D E F G H J K L MNOPQRST


A B CDEFGHJKLMNOPQRST

Variation 29 (continued): 1-9

## variation 2

Or if [T16] for W ... 9: To B [Q16], although W gets three B stones, W stones at the corner are unconditionally captured. W fails.

Variation 30 at move 83 in Diagram 21


A B C DEFGHJKLMNOPQRST


A B C DEFGHJKLMNOPQRST

Variation 30 (continued): 1-4

## variation

[If [S11] for W ...]
4: To here, it's a "loose ko" [B stones are not "tight"; they have more than one liberties. W stones, on the other hand, are "tight]. W clearly fails.

Diagram 22: 83-93

83: B \#83 is emergent, and it's the best move at this moment.
Next -
[See the variation for W \#84.]
84: Therefore...
86: ...W decides to escape. No choice. 87: With B \#87, B is ensured to win this semeai. However, more or less, there is still something left at the corner for W to use -
[See the reference.]

88: To summary this local fight, although $B$ wins the semeai at the corner, $W$ also gains chance to play \#86 and \#88 [O13-N13] to secure the big W team. This is the result of tesuji such as \#78 throw-in [at O12].

89: B \#89 to strengthen the corner, at the same time aiming at L13 boshi [cap move] to attack W.
90: W \#90 jumps, of course.
91: B \#91 sente gains; good timing. [Normally] when B[a] is still sente, B should save \#91. But under present situation, \#91 is appropraite.
93: To B \#93, this local battle comes to a pause.


Variation 31 at move 84 in Diagram 22: 1-12
variation (W \#84)
[When B [S11]...]
1: If W [T18] hane...
4: When B seal$s$ from outside, B will win the semeai. That is...
5: Even if W start$s$ to reduce B's liberties...
12: To B [R8], it becomes a double-ko, and W cannot win it.

A B C D E F G H J K L MNOPQRST


A B CDEFGHJKLMNOPQRST


A B C DEFGHJKLMNOPQRST

Variation 32 at move 88 in Diagram 22: 1-3

## reference

[Later...]
1: W has tesuji of [O18] cut and...
3: ...[Q18] extend.

## Diagram 23: 94

94: W \#94 has three purposes. First is to attack three B stones [D9]; second prepare to break the ladder when W[a] (Although right now it doesn't break the lad-
der, but W can employ \#94 as a base, using the ladder fact , to establish a fighting plan); third is to aim at [b] invasion. However, although \#94 is such a multipurpose move, it'd still be better played at [c]. W[c] kosumi is not only the correct move, but very solid too.


A B CDEFGHJKLMNOPQRST [c] to protect.


A B C DEFGHJKLMNOPQRST

Diagram 24: 95

95:
B \#95 should play $\mathrm{B}[\mathrm{a}]$, since if $\mathrm{B}[\mathrm{a}]$, W cannot [L15] B would have [b] against W [L15], and W's weakness is exposed.
Anyway, as soon as W is separated by B \#95, W's middle team becomes thin, and W's plan of \#94 [F7] to attack three B stones is out of reach. Therefore, as said previously, W [\#94] should play

Diagram 25: 96100

96: Now since B has advanced to \#95 [L15], W has no choice but to counterattack.
100: Next W is aiming at W[a] tesuji.


A B CDEFGHJKLMNOPQRST
103: Therefore B \#103 leads a certain sequence.


A B C DEFGHJKLMNOPQRST

Diagram 26: 101104

101:
B spent 33 minutes on \#101. If $\mathrm{B}[\mathrm{a}]$ to protect the weakness at the corner, W would $\mathrm{W}[\mathrm{b}]$, and the middle two B stones are surrunded. This would be following W's plan, and B of course is not willing to do so.
102: W \#102 hane certainly.
Next -
[See the variation for B \#103.]

## Variation <br> 33

at move 103 in Diagram 26: 1-5
variation (B \#103) [When W [K18]...]
1: If B [L18] crosscut...
5: To here, although B captures a stone at [M16], but W seals tightly from outside, and $B$ gains almost nothing.


ABCDEFGHJKLMNOPQRST


ABCDEFGHJKLMNOPQRST

Diagram 27: 105108

105: B \#105 sagari prevents W[a] tesuji, while forcing W to play low; an efficient move [\#105]. Although W[b] aji is still remained at the corner, but at this moment, to emphasize the fight at middle, ignoring the corner temperorily, is strategically correct.

Diagram 28: 109

109: Since B has [a] sente, B \#109 could have a big jump. This is the result of pervious few moves started with \#103 [L16].


## A B C D E F G H J K L MNOPQRST

Diagram 29: 110134
(124) at 117

114: To here, not only W's plan to attack three B stones at the left is frustrated, W's big team from right to middle is now under attack. B's lead is overwhelming. 115: B \#115 "touch" to test W's reaction. A severe move. The purpose of it -
[See the reference.]

116: W \#116 is the only way to resist.
117: B \#117 is tesuji.
118: If W \#118 atari from [F15] -
[The variation shows the result of this careless move.] 120: If W \#120 connects at [G17] -
[See the variation.]
126: W connects underneath with \#126...
128: ...and \#128. At the same time, however, these moves also make B's middle thick. 129: As soon as the thickness is built up at the upper side, B immediatly turn his spear toward the middle - \#129 boshi [cap]. To attack from this side is the correct direction. Now the purpose of B \#115 touch move [F16] is clear; quietly watch W's reactions to decide the direction to attack W's middle group.
130: When W \#130...
131: ...B \#131 hane. W is extremely painful.
Next -
[See the variation for W \#132.]
132: W \#132. No other way to escape.
Next if $\mathrm{B}[\mathrm{a}]$ to separate $\mathrm{W}, \mathrm{W}[\mathrm{b}]$ is the related [to \#132] tesuji. But not matter what, under this situation, W is bounded to face a painful fight.


ABCDEFGHJKLMNOPQRST


ABCDEFGHJKLMNOPQRST

Variation 34
at move 116 in Dia-
gram 29: 1-4

## reference

[When B [F16]...]
1: If W [E17] backs
up...
4: ...then B [C14] or [C15].

Variation 35
at move 119 in Diagram 29


ABCDEFGHJKLMNOPQRST


ABCDEFGHJKLMNOPQRST

Variation 35 (continued): 1-19
(16) at 11

## variation

[If W chooses L15 ...]
1: B would deliver the following sequence in a hurry...
19: To here, it is a light ko for B, and W cannot take it.

Variation 36 at move 121 in Diagram 29


ABCDEFGHJKLMNOPQRST


A B CDEFGHJKLMNOPQRST

Variation 36 (continued): 1-9

## variation

[Suppose W connects here...]
3: B would [J11] and [H9] first to press W's middle team...
4: W is forced to jump...
5: Then B turns to upper left...
9: To B [C17], W's loss at the corner is huge.

## Variation 37

at move 132 in Diagram 29: 1-8

## variation (W \#132)

[When B [H11]...]
1: If W plays this way...
8: To B [M7], W is in danger.


A B C DEFGHJKLMNOPQRST


A B C DEFGHJKLMNOPQRST

Diagram 30: 135

135: If B \#135 cuts at [a], W[b] to back up, and it would be hard for W to go for the kill.

Diagram 31: 136139

136: When \#136, W thinks that if he does not push a move here, W would be unable to attack B in the future. So \#136 tries to counterattack. But this move is wrong. The correct move would be $\mathrm{W}[\mathrm{a}]$ to defend first. If so, W would have [G10] next, upon which B has to respond with [b]. After that, W[c] to escape, even aim-
ing at $\mathrm{W}[\mathrm{d}]$ invasion. Thus it would be still a unclear, long battle.


A B C DEFGHJKLMNOPQRST

Diagram 32: 140149
(149) at $\otimes$

140:
When W \#140...
141: B \#141 suddenly throws out a violent attack. W is in a deeper trouble.
Against \#141's powerful attack -
[See the variation for W \#142.]
142: W \#142 is the only move to find a way to escape.
147: To here are sure moves by both sides. It has developed to such a situation that it seems impossible for W to unconditionally escape (without paying anything, that is).
148: W is alrealy in extremely danger, but when W \#148 atari...
149: B \#149 connects without hesitation. If this move were to connect at [a], saving \#149 [N10] point as a ko, then it would be a light ko for B. Thus the situation would be simplied, and W would be almost hopeless.
When the game was played to here, Fujisawa 9-dan had used all his given time; he was now in byo-yomi.


ABCDEFGHJKLMNOPQRST


ABCDEFGHJKLMNOPQRST

## Variation 38

at move 142 in Dia-
gram 32: 1-12
variation ( W \#142)
[When B [H8]...]
1: If W to push through...
12: To B [L10], W collapses.

## Diagram 33: 150

150: W \#150 tesuji, the only move to escape. If W[a] instead, $\mathrm{B}[\mathrm{b}]$ and W has no move to follow.
Also, if W[b] -
[See the variation.]


ABCDEFGHJKLMNOPQRST


A B CDEFGHJKLMNOPQRST

Variation 39 at move 151 in Diagram 33

Variation 39 (continued): 1-5

## variation

[If [N7] instead of [L7] for W...]
5: ...To B [N5], W moves don't work.


ABCDEFGHJKLMNOPQRST


A B C D E F G H J K L MNOPQRST

Diagram 34: 151

151: B \#151 is the best response [to W \#150]. Next if W[a], $\mathrm{B}[\mathrm{b}]$, and W stil1 cannot escape.

Diagram 35: 152153

152: W \#152 and \#150 are related tesuji's.
Next if B[a] to cut W apart -
[See the variation for B \#153.]


A B C D E F G H J K L MNOPQRST


A B CDEFGHJKLMNOPQRST

## Variation <br> 40

at move 153 in Dia-
gram 35: 1-6

## variation (B \#153)

[When W [M6]...]
1: If B [N7] to extend...
2: W has [K7]...
[This shows the importance of W [L7].] 6: [O6] and W escapes.

Diagram 36: 154156

154: When W \#154, if $\mathrm{B}[\mathrm{a}]$ cut next, it would be a ko.
However, even if B tenuki here, letting W play one more move, W still cannot really turn it around. That is, after B tenuki, even if $\mathrm{W}[\mathrm{a}]$ to connect, B still can play [b] to threaten with a ko. When W[c] connects, B [d] cleans it up, and B's middle becomes very thick. If so, W team only barely escapes from danger, but globally, W would be far behind.
155: After careful observation over the whole board, B decisively connects with \#155. B realizes that even if he doesn't force a ko, B would have had enough. From this point
of view, B \#155 is indeed a wise choice.
Fujisawa 9-dan has only 1 minute left [the "last minute" that a player in byo-yomi uses over and over], but he was still able to calmly judge the global situation. This fully exhibits his steady and solid style.
156: W \#156's purpose is to find a way to finish the ko here.


A B C DEFGHJKLMNOPQRST

Diagram 37: 157161 (161) at $\triangle$

157: B \#157 cut this way is dangerous. B[a] to connect , insisting to make a worry-free ko, is the most solid move.
Now with this \#157 cut, this ko becomes heavy. That is, if B will lose the ko, he will have to pay.
160: W \#160 has to respond. If W tenuki and, say, finish the ko at right [by


ABCDEFGHJKLMNOPQRST


A B CDEFGHJKLMNOPQRST

## Variation <br> 41

 at move 161 in Diagram 37Variation 41 (continued): 1-6

## reference

[Say W captures [L6] stone...]
1: B would [B6] to block...
6: To here it's another ko. But this is *after* B cuts down three W stones [D8] then makes a light ko. This plan [by W ] is not worth considering.


A B CDEFGHJKLMNOPQRST

Diagram 38: 162211
(180, (186), (192) at $\triangle$,
183, 189 at 163

162: W \#162 is the last losing move. This move -
[See the variation.] \#162 threat is too small. Also, even if W[a] for \#162, letting B finish the ko, then $\mathrm{W}[\mathrm{b}]$ to cut B - globally, W is stil1 short - W's only chance is to play as the variation shows.

165: When B gets \#165, this game is already over.
The gap between two sides is quite big. Facing an overwhelming lead of $\mathrm{B}, \mathrm{W}$ is impossible to turn it around. The moves followed are only for own amusement, not really worth commenting.
[Wu's overview of the game is shown later.]
170: (Overview) Looking back the game, at the opening period, because of some inappropraite personal inclinations in \#18 and \#20, when B \#29, it was not optimistic for W. Then a fight initiated by W \#30 made own [W] stones heavy. As a result, W was attacked severely and cleverly. (To be continued)
172: (Overview; continued) Since \#68 cut, W looked for chances to maneuver over the upper right corner, hoping to settle a team at the right side. During this complicated conflict, although W achieved the goal to get rid of the trouble, but then \#94 was played at wrong direction, thus B \#95 started another violent fight. (To be continued)
175: (Overview; continued) W attempted to counter B's violent attack and rushed with \#136. This move was a serious mistake, led to B's sente attacks - W fell to being onesided attacked. Although W tried to counterattack, but never got the chance. (To be continued)
179: (Overview; continued) The battle continued to \#154, finally making a ko. This ko was very easy to B, since win or loss [of this ko] wouldn't effect B's being leading. But it was on the other hand a huge, live-or-die ko to W. With such a difference in lightness and heaviness, B eventually calmly played \#155, filling up the holes at upper right corner. (To be continued)
181: (Overview; continued) W \#156 was the final struggle. Since \#157's response was inproper, the nature of the ko changed. W suddenly saw a hope to turn it around, be-
ing obviously down. Unfortunately, W \#162 was less careful, finding a ko threat that was too small. When B \#163 finished the ko, the outcome was then decided. [End of overview by Wu.]
184: [Overview by Katsumoto, who collected these comments by Wu.]
From opening to middle game, Fujisawa 9-dan's unique thick and solid style was vividly shown on the board. He fully exhibited his careful yet sharp character, and using thickness to apply violent attack is Fujisawa 9-dan's specialty. We can see in this game, facing a strong oppoent, B played calmly, attacked completely, and advanced breathlessly, never giving $W$ much chance. This is indeed a recent masterpiece by Fujisawa 9-dan.


A B CDEFGHJKLMNOPQRST

## Variation

 at move 163 in Diagram 38

A B CDEFGHJKLMNOPQRST

Variation 42 (con-
tinued): 1-6
variation
W
should play [T15].
3: When B [Q11] threatens...
4: $W$ can ignore it! [K6] finishes the ko...
5: Then when B cuts...

6: W [G13] gets the emergent point, attacking, and eventually trying to capture, the big B team. There is no other way for W to win the game.


A B CDEFGHJKLMNOPQRST

Diagram 39: 212233

233: To \#233, B leads by more than 10 points on the board. No more changes seem likely. B has won for sure.
233: Total of 233 moves. B wins by resignation.
Time given: 10 hours apiece
Time consumed:
White: 8 hours 43
minutes
Black: 9 hours 59
minutes

