## Chapter 9

## Go Seigen-Shimamura

The 1st Japan's Strongest Deciding Matches<br>Go Seigen vs Shimamura<br>White: Go Seigen 9d<br>Black: Shimamura Toshihiro 8d<br>December 21, 1957<br>Japan<br>Komi: 5.5<br>Result: W+Resign<br>Time: 10 hours each



## A B C D E F G H J K L MNOPQRST

Diagram 1: 1-8

Go Seigen (Wu) vs. Shimamura (Oza Special Match)

Black: Shimamura Toshihiro, 8d
White: Go Seigen (Wu), 9d
Date: December 21, 1957
Place: Japan
1: As usual, the winner of the Nihon Keizai Newspaper sponsored Oza title of each year got to play Go Seigen 9-dan for a special match.
The 3-game title matches of 1956 Oza were played between Shimamura Toshihiro 8dan and Kansai Ki-in's Handa Dogen 8-dan. Shimamura 8-dan defeated Handa 8-dan two straight, winning the Oza title, and as pre-arranged, he earned the chance to play a special game with Go Seigen 9-dan.
2: Durning last year's [1956] various games, the most notable player, besides Go Seigen 9-dan, was probably Shimamura 8-dan. This showed his extraordinary strength.
In the "Hightest Dan" matches, Shimamura 8-dan won the title with a 6-2 score, and he would soon meet the title holder of 1957, Kitani Minoru 9-dan. In the Honinbo league play, although losing to Fujisawa Hosai 9-dan and Kitani Minoru 9-dan, he was still leading overall. Also, with an outstanding record in the preliminary round of "Japan's Strongest Deciding Matches", he had qualified for the semi-final round.
Showing such a tremendous strength in various big matches and keeping a steady record - such players were rare.
3: Shimamura 8-dan was just in such a good condition when he met Go Seigen 9-dan in this game. Recently, the two had not met, so this was a game that people had looked forward to.
4: Three years ago, Shimamura 8-dan had met Go Seigen 9-dan in the Yomiuri Newspaper sponsored "Wu vs Selected 7 or 8 Dan" tournament. Thereafter, Shimamura 8 -dan gradually became a star in the go world. This game was the first time since their last meet, and the Shimamura 8-dan of 3 years later had been different.
5: B \#1 and \#3 occupied the two hoshi points at the diagonal corners, as if they were a
2-stone game setup. This is an favorite opening of Shimamura 8-dan.

6: Shimamura 8-dan's style was that of "steady" type. No matter how his oppenent tried to irritate him, he treated it calmly. Making steady moves and approaching opponent gradually were his favorite strategies. He was a player of lasting fights.
In this game, however, $B$ had to give a komi of 5.5 points, the biggest komi among all the games [of that time]. Perhaps because of this, or because this was the first game with Go Seigen 9-dan after a long time and he eagerly tried to show the strength he had accumulated - in short, in this game, he showed a style that was different from his normally steady and cautious approaches; instead, he played aggressively. As a result, however, because of his big misread, he lost a big group when the game was still in the opening period.
7: From the watchers' point of view, this game was probably over by then. But in reality it was not so simple. The death of a big group didn't necessarily decide the outcome of the whole game. Because of the inspiring struggle by Shimamura 8-dan, the game became less optimistic for $W$. The violent fights continued, and for a while, it became an unclear game.
8: Even though having captured a group of the opponent, it was not the case that one could sleep the rest of the way. One shall see this point in Go Seigen 9-dan's clear and straight commentary.
One can also learn from this game that to eventually win a game, how much obstacle one has to overcome.
W \#8 to play at [a] kosumi would be solid. Which way is better, keima [\#8] or kosu$\mathrm{mi}[\mathrm{a}]$, depends on the surrounding situation. This difference resembles the difference between big knight corner enclosure and small knight corner enclosure. W \#8 in the game was to look for changes, and it's a move of imagination.


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Diagram 2: 9-11

9: B \#9 to play here now is good.
If $B$ gets \#9 after W has invaded at [a] [See the reference.]

Variation 1 at move 10 in Diagram 2


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Variation 1 (continued): 1-12
(1) at $\triangle$,
(8) at 1

## reference

If $B$ tenuki and $W$ gets to invade at [M3]...
1: When B plays [R3] now...
12: To here, B lost locally.

Diagram 3: 12

12: If W \#12 this move hane at [a] [See the variation.] Here, B \#11 [Q4] forcing W \#12 gained in sente.


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Variation 2 at move 13 in Diagram 3

Variation 2 (continued): 1-11
(4) at $\triangle$

## variation

If W atari at [R2] instead of [R5]...
11: To here, W is sealed inside.


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Diagram 4: 13-15

13: B \#13 is an excellent fuseki point. Amateur players like to extend to [a] or [b], but the real good points are to extend to the point beneath the star point on the side.
\#13 or [c] are such points, and B could have chosen either one. But since \#13 would be a good extension point for $W$ too, so $B$ choosing

## \#13 is better than [c].

14: When W \#14 approaches the corner...
15: Since B has had an extension at the bottom, \#15 forms a nice shape.


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Diagram 5: 16-17

16: W \#16 could also play [a].

Diagram 6: 18

18: W \#18 is just the right distance from the big knight corner enclosure at the top. Had it been a small knight corner enclosure at the top ([C14] at [a]), \#18 playing at [b] would be the right position.
No matter what, after $W$ \#16 and B \#17 exchange ([B4][C3]), W could not tenuki here. Without W \#18 or W[b], B[c] would be severe.


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Diagram 7: 19

19: B \#19 to play at [a] would be a passive approach. S ince $B$ has the burden of 5.5 komi, \#19 chooses the biggest extension.
[Also,] when the op-ponen-
t is a big knight enclosure, to approach to the biggest extend like this is aggressive and positive.

Diagram 8: 20

20: W \#20's purpose it to expand the moyo at the left side, and at the same time aiming at [a] invasion.


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Diagram 9: 21-22

21: Although B \#21 to defend at [a] would be solid, but W would get \#21 [R14] next, and it would be an easy and smooth opening for W. B \#21 as played is an aggressive and fast-paced opening move.
Next (W \#22) -
[See the variation.]
22: W \#22 invades as orginally planned. To start a fight here is what W should do.

Variation 3 at move 22 in Diagram 9: 16
variation (W \#22)
[When B \#21 [R14] shimari (corner enclosure)...]
1: W could choose [G16] strategy.
6: To here, W has expanded the moyo on the left side. However, in this picture, B would have either [a] invasion or [b] to observe W's reaction. If W is just a little bit careless here, the result could turn out to be that B gets territory while W's moyo gets damaged. Therefore, W [G16] is not the best strategy.


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Diagram 10: 23

23: B \#23 certainly. $\mathrm{B}[\mathrm{a}]$ would be mediocre - when $\mathrm{W}[\mathrm{b}]$, B would be no good.

Diagram 11: 24

24: $\mathrm{W} \# 24$ is also the only move. If B next (\#25) extends at [a] -
[The variations show variations for B's next move.]


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Variation 4 at move 25 in Diagram 11: 1-13
variation 1 (B \#25)
[When
W [F14] hane ...]
1: If B extends...
7: If this B move [G14] connect$s$ at [L17], W [G14] would be severe, so $B$ has to bend here [G14].
13: To here, W is not bad.

Variation 5 at move 25 in Diagram 11: 1-10
variation 2 (B \#25)
[W [F14] hane...]
1: Again if B [G15] extends...
2: W could also choose to press here...
6: W [J16] kosumi to get out...
10: To here, [a] and [b] are miai moves for W , and W's fighting shape is not bad either.


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Variation 6 at move 25 in Diagram 11: 1-8
variation 3 (B \#25)
[Again, after W [F14] hane...]
5: If B chooses [J16] to capture one W stone...
8: To here, W gets a big moyo on the left side, and later $\mathrm{W}[\mathrm{a}]$ is sente endgame move.

Diagram 12: 25

25: [As shown,] B would not be satisfied with the variations after [G15] extension, so \#25 hane here first.
Next if W plays [a]
[The
variations show this variation.]


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Variation 7 at move
26 in Diagram 12:
1-6
variation 1 (W \#26)
[When
B [E16] hane...]
1:
If W draws back...
3: Next if W seeks connection...
6: B would hane. In this shape, $\mathrm{B}[\mathrm{a}]$ would be sente, so $B$ is thick. If so, B would get a wide moyo, and W is no good. W [G17] needs to be reconsidered.

Variation 8 at move 26 in Diagram 12: 1-13
variation 2 (W \#26)
[Again...]
3: In this variation, W chooses [J17].
13: To here, W shape is better than the one shown in variation 1. In this picture, W later has [a] hane.
In the game, however, $W$ adopted a different variation.


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Diagram 13: 26

26: Which is better, \#26 hane atari or [a] drawing back? W indeed hesitated at that moment. Then, seeing B \#25 [E16] hane, W decided to go for the stronger move at \#26.

Diagram 14: 27

27: After W hane atari, B \#27 is the only move. Simply looking at the shape, B cannot connect at [a].
If $B[a]$ connects, $W$ would of course play [b].


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Diagram 15: 28-31

29: These two moves are certainly the consequence of W \#26 [G15].
Although W lost the benefit at the corner, the shape after capturing a stone [ponnuki] is very thick, and there are stil1 ways to invade the corner. Based on this, W chose \#26 earlier.
Next (W \#30) -
[See the variation.] 30: W \#30 is the correct move, and it's a key point that should not be ignored. 31: B \#31 is also the only move.
$\mathrm{B}[\mathrm{a}]$ would be allowing W to gain in sente, and after $\mathrm{W}[\mathrm{b}]$ next, B is disadvantageous.


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Variation 9 at move 30 in Diagram 15: 1-8
variation (W \#30)
[After B [C17]...]
1: If W approaches the corner now...
2: B would push immediately.
7: These are certainly the consequent moves.
8: Then B would get [B16] kosumi, gainning big at the corner (about 20 points).
Later, even if W[a] to get the outside, but after $\mathrm{B}[\mathrm{a}]$ sente endgame move, there isn't much left for W at the top.


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Diagram 16: 32-34

32: Since W got [G17], \#32 [E17] has become valid. This move is extremely big.
Next B \#33 was too greedy.
[See the variation for B \#33 first.]
33: B \#33 played here, however, aiming at [a] next.
[See the variation for W's response.]
34: $W$ \#34 is a severe move! Shimamura 8-dan later
said, when he calculated the variations here, he missed this move. [See the variation for B's answer.]


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Variation 10 at move 33 in Diagram 16: 1-8
variation (B \#33)
[When W [E17]... ]
1: B atari...
5: To here B lives the corner. And this is all B can do.
6: Then W turns to the lower right corner.
8: To here, this was what W planned. In the process, if $B$ [M4] played at [a] to reduce W's moyo , W would play [b] to invade.

Variation 11 at move 34 in Diagram 16: 1-4
variation (W \#34)
[When B [C15]... ] 1: If W hane...
2: B would hane too.
4: To here, [a] and [b] are miai moves for B. This was B's purpose for [C15] move.
However -

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Variation 12 at move 35 in Diagram 16: 1-6
variation (B \#35)
[When W [B16]... ]
1: If B [B15] sagar-
i...

6: To here, even if B escapes, it would not be good.

Diagram 17: 35-37

35: W \#34 [B16] hit the fatal point, and $B$ has no time to play [a] sagari; B has to connect at \#35 first. After B \#35, what severe moves has $W$ pre-
pared? The readers might want to think about it first.
36: W \#36 hane is the first strike to kill B corner.
37: B \#37 this move
[See the variation.]


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Variation 13 at move 38 in Diagram 17

Variation 13 (continued): 1-5

## variation

If $B$ pushes here [B15]...
3: To here, B is not good.
4: Next if B [C13]... 5: W [B12] and B cannot escape.


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Diagram 18: 38-39

38: W \#38 is another sharp move.
B has been aiming at [a] sagari, but W just doesn't give B the chance.
39: Although B \#39 captures one stone...

Diagram 19: 40-41

40: After W \#40, $B$ is still not alive! One has to marvel over such a frightening tesuji.
But the variation$s$ followed are complex and difficult. Please read on.
41: B \#41 -
[See the variation.]
When B \#41, if W casually connects at [a], B[b] and B lives.


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Variation 14 at move 42 in Diagram 19

Variation 14 (continued): 1-5

## variation

If B connects here [B17]...
3: B still doesn't have the second eye. 4:
Then, if B [D14]... 5: W [C13] and B can't escape.


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Diagram 20: 42-46

42: $W$ \#42 sagar$i$ is another marvelous move. Even if $B[a]$ to capture two $W$ stones next [See the reference.] 44: W \#44 hane, and B group is captured!
During this fight, $W$ delivered several excellent moves, eventually killed B group. It seemed that Go Seigen 9dan had read everything out when he made \#34 [B16]. W
\#34 this move took 21 minutes.
45: B \#45 and the next couple of moves lost some good ko threats. They should be omitted now.


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a good move. Needless to say, $B$ is aiming at $B[a]$ hane. If W answers with [b] -
[The variations show this variation.]

Variation 15 at move 43 in Diagram 20: 1-6
(2) at $\otimes$

## reference

[When
W sagari [C19]... ]
1: If B captures two stones...
2: W could get one back. Next -
6: To here, B still can't make two eyes.

Diagram 21: 47-49

48: After W \#48 takes a stone back [*** 'B' to 'D' see some reference diagrams.]
49: When W \#48 [E17], B big group is claimed dead. W seems to be in an absolute advantage, but in fact it is not so simple.
After 41 miuntes of deliberation, B \#49 attaches on a W stone. This is indeed


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Variation 16 at move 49 in Diagram 21: 1-8
reference 1
[After W [E17]... ]
1: If B hane out...
8: B cannot escape.

Variation 17 at move 49 in Diagram 21: 1-6

## reference 2

[This is similar to reference 1.]
6: B's escaping path is blocked.


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Variation 18 at move 49 in Diagram 21: 1-12
reference 3
[Again...]
5: Here W chooses to press one more move.
6: W would cut.
11: To here, although B seals W inside...
12: But W can play [A14] to live inside.

Variation 19 at move 50 in Diagram 21: 1-12

## variation 1 ( W \#50)

[When B [D9]... ]
1: If W [C8]...
2: B would hane immediately.
12: To here, $B$ gets out and W's situation would be difficult to handle.


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Variation 20 at move 50 in Diagram 21: 1-10
variation 2 (W \#50)
[Again...]
5: If W cuts here...
10: To here W fails.

Diagram 22: 50-53

50: Therefore, W \#50 defends a move here. But this move is wrong.
Had W \#50 protected at [a] or [b], it would be W's favorable situation. But since W played \#50 actually, it left sente peep at [b] for $B$, and that directly influenced the attack on B [D9] stone.
Exactly where W should defend didn't seem to be a big problem, but it in fact affected the outcome of the game; the differece was huge. 51: B made many moves at upper left corner, but still got killed. During professional games, such a result means the collapse of the whole game, and it's almost impossible
to turn it around. But the subtle difference in W \#50 brought a big change to the global situation, and one cannot say that $W$ is absolutely leading now.
52: However, B has at least lost the sente advantage - there is no doubt on that.
53: B \#53 connects. Next move (W \#54) -
[See the variation.]


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Variation 21 at move 54 in Diagram 22: 1-3
variation (W \#54)
[When B [C9] connects... ]
1: Even if W jumps...

3: Since B has either [a] or [b] tesuji, W has no effective way to attack this B group.


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Diagram 23: 54-55

54: Since W doesn't have any severe moves to attack the B team right away, \#54 decides to defend a move. On one hand it keeps W's eyeshape, and on the other hand it eliminates $\mathrm{B}[\mathrm{a}$ ] tesuji. After this strengthening at the bottom, W can start to attack the three B stones from [b] in the future.
55: B \#55 good point. Although W captured the upper left corner, but after the left side was damaged by $B$ in sente, and $B$ got the good point of \#55, overall, W didn't gain very much. Also, W currently has no proper way to attack three B stones on the left side; this is another big loss to W .


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Diagram 24: 56-60

56: W \#56 very much wants to advance to [a]. However, if W[a], B[b] would be an excellent approaching point. After B[b] [The
variations show references.]
58: W \#58 is the biggest point on the board.
In this shape, after W \#58 invades the corner, it would be a ko.
[The difference between this one and all the reference diagrams just shown is that, of course, [R11] is not at [R12].]


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Variation 22 at move 57 in Diagram 24


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Variation 22 (continued): 1-8
reference 1
[After B gets [R12] point... ]
1: When W invades the corner...
8: To here, W is dead.

Variation 23 at move 57 in Diagram 24


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Variation 23 (continued): 1-4
reference 2
[Again, if B gets [R12]...]
3: If W extends this way...
4: B [Q18] sagari, and W can't make two eyes.
Go
Seigen 9-dan commented to [Q18], but why $W$ cannot make two eyes here might not be clear to some basic to intermediate level of players. Please con-
sult the reference diagrames.
[The variations show the five reference diagrams.] [*** When finished, '[' to continue.]


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Variation 23.1 at move 5 in Variation 23: 1-6
reference 1 (corner)
1: If W [R18]...
6: W is dead.

Variation 23.2 at move 5 in Variation 23: 1-10
reference 2 (corner)
1: If W plays here [R15]...
4: B [S13] blocks...
5: If this W move plays at [a], B[b] captures a stone and the result is the same as shown in reference 1 of this corner. 6: Next, B [T14] atari is good.
10: W wouldn't get a ko here.


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Variation 23.2
(continued): 11-12
12. W is dead.

Variation 23.3 at move 5 in Variation 23: 1-10
reference 3 (corner)
1: [The beginning is the same as in reference 2.]
6: [When B [T14] atari...]
7:
If W plays [T17]...
10 :


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Variation 23.4 at move 5 in Variation 23: 1-12
reference 4 (corner)
1: [A slight variation of reference 3 at the corner.]
9: If W chooses [T15] (in reference 3, it was [S19])...
12: W is still dead.

Variation 23.5 at move 5 in Variation 23: 1-10
reference 5 (corner)
1: [A variation of reference 2.]
7: If W [S15] connects...
8: B has [S19].
10: W still can't make two eyes.


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Diagram 25: 61

61: Since [R11] stone is not at [a], $\mathrm{B}[\mathrm{b}]$ instead of \#61 wouldn't work [consult the reference diagrams].

Diagram 26: 62-64

64: After W \#64, if $\mathrm{B}[\mathrm{b}]$ hane immediately [See the variation.]


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Variation 24 at move 65 in Diagram 26: 1-6
variation (B \#65)
[When W [S18]... ] 1: If B hane right away...
4: When W looks for a ko threat here... 5: If B finishes the ko...
6: [E10] would be enough for W .

Diagram 27: 65-71

65: When B \#65, if $\mathrm{W}[\mathrm{a}]$ to live the upper right corner, $\mathrm{B}[\mathrm{b}]$ keima would block W inside.
To be blocked here by $B$ in sente is unbearable.
69: B \#69 hane. The ko fight finally starts.


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Diagram 28: 72

72: Since B on the left
side already jumped out one move, so if \#72 this move to threat at [a] would not be good after $B$ answers with [b]. Therefore W can't threat like [a].
B also has strong threat at [c]. Will B continue to fight this ko?

Diagram 29: 73

73: If B \#73 answers the threat with [a] to continue the ko, after W captures [R18], assume $\mathrm{B}[\mathrm{b}]$ and $\mathrm{W}[\mathrm{c}]$ nex-
t. Then after B captures back [Q18], W[d] would create countless ko threats. Therefore, B \#73 decides to finish the ko at upper right corner, of course. Compare the two corners at the top, B's is bigger.


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Diagram 30: 74-75

75: B \#75 plays at [a] would be solid, but this allows W to gain in sente.
B \#75 keima is a good move since it creates various chances. In short, as long as B separates W here, no matter how it will develop, the fight will be favorable to $B$.

Diagram 31: 76-83

79: W \#78 [M3] and B \#79 [S2] are miai. 83: Looking at the whole board, after B \#83 defends the corner, W's situation is not optimistic anymore.
After B \#83, although W[a] nex$t$ to limit the $B$ stone is the correc$t$ move, but $W$ has realized, if W continues to play steadily and carefully like this, W will start to trail.
[See the reference.]


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Variation 25 at move 84 in Diagram 31: 1-4

## reference

[After B [B3] protects the corner...] 1: If W [K4]...
4: B would immediately settle this group on the left side. Now rougly compare the territory on both sides in this picture: upper left versus upper right, B has about 10 points more; B and W are about the same at lower right;

W's lower side is about the same as B's lower left; and B and W are about the same on the left side. If so, even with B's komi of 5.5 points, W is not in much better shape.


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kosumi attachment is normally the urgent point. 91: When B \#91...


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Diagram 32: 84-91

84: W \#84 is to grab B's base, so W will be able to gain by attacking this B group. At the same time, this move itself is worth over 10 points. Next if $\mathrm{B}[\mathrm{a}]$, W would [b] - chasing B team would be W's plan. 87: B of course starts from the bottom, and W is ready for it.
88: W \#88 tesuji.
In shapes like this, a

Diagram 33: 92-94

92: W \#92 jumps to separate two B groups, and W is racing against $B$ stones toward the center.
Next if B[a], W[b] of course. But B cannot play so conservatively for safety's sake.
93: If B hurries to settle the left side, it would be falling into W's plan, so B \#93 starts from the right side.


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Diagram 34: 95-96

95: Next (W \#96) if $\mathrm{W}[\mathrm{a}], \mathrm{B}[\mathrm{b}]$ hane to attack three W stones.
96: [Therefore,] W \#96 has no other choice.
[See the reference.]

Variation 26 at move 97 in Diagram 34: 1-8

## reference

[After W [R6]... ]
1: If B still plays hane at [P6]..
8: To here, W is safe.


A B C DEFGHJKLMNOPQRST

Diagram 35: 97100

97: When B \#97, if $\mathrm{W}[\mathrm{a}]$ blocks, B would temporarily ignore the left side and play [b] to get the W stones at the bottom. Later, even if W adds another move on the left side, since B has [c] peep and $\mathrm{B}[\mathrm{d}]$ -W[e]-B[f] cross-cut tesuji, it would not be a sure thing for W to capture the B team. That is, to let B get profit [at the bottom] first before trying to kill B team on the left is not a safe strategy. 100: [Therefore,] W has to plays this way to secure this group first, regardless of the shape.


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Diagram 36: 101106

101: B \#101 connects, aiming at [a] to escape one stone. Had
B played [b] first, after W[c]-B[d]-W[e], $B[a]$ wouldn't save a stone and B would be no good.
106: To W \#106, W is connected.

Diagram 37: 107108

107: B has been aiming at \#107.
108: W \#108 turns to attack. This is just the right timing.
Next (\#109) if B[a], W would $[\mathrm{b}]-\mathrm{B}$ is not good.


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Diagram 38: 109124

109: B \#109 is a powerful tesuji. Next -
[See the variation.]
111: B \#111 good move. Next (W \#112) -
[See the variation.]
112: [Therefore,] W \#112 hane [to avoid complicted situation].
115: B \#115 is also a good move.
[See the variation.]
117: When B \#117
cross-cut -
[See the variation for W's next move.]
122: To W \#122, if B[a] to connect, this B group would have lived, and the game would be in favor of B .
[See the variation for B's next move.]
123: [In the game, however,] B \#123 is an overplay.
124: After W gets \#124, this B team is now in danger.
Go Seigen 9-dan says, B's situation on the board is not that bad, but since B has had a big group killed earlier, and that might have affected Shimamura 8-dan psychologically. Did he feel that he had to struggle to the end and thus became hasty here?
After W \#124, although B is in danger now, it's not to say that B has no way to live. Let's look at Go Seigen 9-dan's analysis.
[See the reference.]


A B C D E F G H J K L M N O P Q R S T


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## Variation

27 at move 110 in Diagram 38: 1-4

## variation (W \#110)

[When B [E6] peeps...]

1: If W plays this way...
4: Since B has [F7], W fails.

Variation 28
at move 112 in Diagram 38: 1-17
variation (W \#112)
[When B [B6]... ]
1: If W [B5]...
4: B
[B11] and [C12] are good moves.
8: To here, it's difficult for W to catch this B team.
9: Therefore, W defends a move here.
11: Next, after this exchange...
14: If $B$ is willing to make alive here...
15: W would hane...

17: And push a move here. In this shape, W [A4] sagari leaves some aji at the corner, and $\mathrm{W}[\mathrm{a}$ ] can capture a stone in sente, while B only makes alive in gote. If so, W of course is good. However, earlier, instead of living with [A6], B might play [b] - in
that case, it would be complicated. Therefore -


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Variation 29 (continued): 1-3
variation
If B plays [B8] to capture a stone instead...
3: B can't make two eyes.


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## Variation <br> 30

at move 118 in Diagram 38: 1-4
variation (W \#118)
[When B [C12]... ]
1: If W hastily atari...

4: B would live easily.

## Variation 31

at move 123 in Dia-
gram 38: 1-15
variation (B \#123)
[After W [C10]... ]
1: [If B connects here, B would have lived.]
2: Next, even if W kosumi here first...
9: To here $B$ gets one eye.
15: To here, W makes the second eye.


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Variation 32
at move 125 in Diagram 38: 1-25

## (9) at 1

## reference

After W [E9]...
1: B can start from here...
5: ...To make a ko.
7: When B looks for ko threat, even if $B$ gets to play [a] and [b], B stil1 can't eat W group [on the right side] right away. Therefore B would choose [O8] as a ko threat.

13: Both sides proceed to here...
16: Then, although W now captures B's group on the left side...
21: B, too, gets these two moves to capture the W team on the bottom.
24: When W [K15] to reduce B's moyo...
25: B jumps out. If so, the outcome of the game is yet to be decided by fights in the future.


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Diagram 39: 125149

125: [But] B \#125 connects. This is a fatal losing move. 126: W \#126 kosumi , and B group is on the edge of collapse. In this shape, it's already impossible for B to make an eye at the middle.
130: W \#130 to destroy B's eyeshape. Next (B \#131) [See the variation.] 134:
W \#134 boshi [capping move], and B's path is blocked. The only way for $B$ now is to cut down this $W$ team at the bottom, creating some chances.
139: Now it's basically a semeai [capturing race].
145: To here, B captures the W stones at the bottom [J4], but compare with the exchange shown in an earlier reference [at node \#124], it's clear that this way to capture W stones is not big. On the other hand, W captures the B team on the left side in a big way. The difference is too huge to compare.
(At the bottom, if $\mathrm{W}[\mathrm{a}], \mathrm{B}[\mathrm{b}]$, and W is dead.)


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Variation
33
at move 131 in Diagram 39: 1-4
varation (B \#131)
[When W [A9] kosumi... ]
1: If B extends out...
4: These two W moves would kill the space for a B eye. The W stones at the top are very solid, and $B$ has no way to escape.

Diagram 40: 150164

150: To W \#150, W is two-liberty faster in the semeai. If $\mathrm{B}[\mathrm{a}$ ] wedges in, W would [b] to connect ; or if $\mathrm{B}[\mathrm{b}]$ wedges in, W[a] to connect (W has 7 liberties, while B has 5).
155: Even though it was such a difficult game, Go Seigen 9dan still spent not much time, as usual.
164: Total of 164 moves. W wins by
resignation.
Time given: 10 hours apiece
Time consumed:

Black: 7 hours 26 minutes
White: 4 hours 40 minutes

